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The Financial Stability Board represents the most important institutional innovation in the 
global economic governance architecture that has emerged from response the global 
financial crisis originated in the summer of 2007 from the US subprime mortgage 
markets. This institution was created by the G20 at the height of the global financial 
crisis with the task of urgently coordinating the international regulatory response to the 
crisis. However, rather than being a short-term fix in response to the crisis, the FSB has 
been given a central role in promoting international financial stability. In the words of the 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, the FSB should have become a ‘Fourth Pillar’ 
in global economic governance along with the IMF, the WB and the WTO (US Treasury 
2009).  
However, this label overlooks the fact that the commonalities between the FSB and the 
other three pillars are far fewer that the elements that set these institutions apart. The 
FSB can rely in the pursuit of its mandate neither the large staff and financial resources 
of the IMF and World Bank, nor on the legal standing and the power to devise legally 
enforceable agreements of the WTO. Instead, the FSB’s mandate, internal structure, 
and membership make this a rather unique institution in the global economic governance 
architecture.  
How can we explain the unique nature of the FSB and the differences with other 
institutions that populate the existing global economic governance architecture? Whose 
preferences and paradigms are reflected in the evolution of the mandate, internal 
governance, and membership of the institution? And what kind of power is the FSB 
capable to exercise over the different players that populate the governance of 
international financial markets?   
These are the questions that will be analyzed in this chapter. The first section will 
provide a historical overview of the FSB starting from the emerging market crises of the 
late 1990s to the first significant revision of its Charter in 2012. The second section will 
explore the expansion in the tasks performed by the FSB over this period. This analysis 
will illustrate an evolution in the role of the FSB from being primarily a coordination 
mechanism to an institution capable to exercise a greater independent impact over the 
global economic governance. The third part will different measures introduced since the 
beginning of the crisis to strengthen the institutional bases of the FSB in support of the 
growing set of tasks. Finally, the fourth part will analyze the membership of the FSB. 
This section will discuss how the FSB has evolved from a narrow club to a more 
inclusive organisation, and how it interacts with those non-member countries. 
 
   
 
 
2. From the Financial Stability Forum to the Board: a Short History 
 
While the creation of the FSB represents the primary institutional innovation in the global 
economic governance to emerge from the global financial crisis of 2008-2010, the roots 
of this institution can be found in the response to a previous wave of financial instability a 
decade earlier. The Mexican crisis of 1994 and the East Asian crisis of 1997-98 had the 
effect of opening an international debate over the possible reforms to the international 
financial regulatory architecture emerged since the 1970s (Eichengreen 1999).  
In response to these shocks, the G7 charged the President of the German Bundesbank 
Hans Tietmeyer with the task of consulting with other policymakers regarding possible 
arrangements to strengthen the capacity of existing national and transnational financial 
regulatory authorities to detect and respond to emerging vulnerabilities. The report 
presented by Tietmeyer in 1999 highlighted the tension between the global integration of 
financial markets and the continuous fragmentation along sectoral lines of the patchwork 
of existing international standard-setting organisations. The Tietmeyer Report also noted 
that while the existing regulatory institutions were capable to monitor the evolving risks in 
a specific sector none of the existing institutions had the breadth of information to assess 
the evolving risks in the entire financial markets, what Tietmeyer called ‘macro-
prudential’ issues (Tietmeyer 1999, 3).  
The Tietmeyer Report provided the blueprint for the creation of the Financial Stability 
Forum, which met for the first time in April 1999.  The newly created body was described 
as a ‘club of clubs’ (Drezner 2007, 136), bringing together for the first time 
representatives of the most important standard-setting bodies that had emerged along 
sectoral lines since the 1970s (Basel Committee, International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, International 
Association of Insurance Supervisors, International Accounting Standards Board. 
Committee on the Global Financial System), as well as representatives of more formal 
international organisations (Bank for International Settlements, IMF, World Bank, and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Moreover, the design of the 
FSF also included national representation from central banks, finance ministries, and 
regulatory and supervisory authorities from the G-7 countries. This composition reflected 
the desire to bring together all the major national and international authorities in charge 
of promoting international financial stability, as well as to increase the political support 
behind their development and implementation of international financial rules by 
increasing the engagement of finance ministries (Green 2011).  However, the 
institutional design of the FSF also reflected the preferences of the most industrialized 
countries represented in the G7 for a more incremental kind of reform of the existing 
architecture over the creation of ambitious new international regulatory institutions with 
substantive powers over domestic regulatory policies.  
 
The contribution of the FSF in bolstering financial stability during its first decade has 
been less significant than envisioned by its creators. One of the key initiatives launched 
by the FSF in its initial year has been to bring order to the plethora of international 
standards and codes and to identify ‘Twelve Key Standards for Sound Financial 
Systems’ whose implementation should have been prioritized from countries all around 
the world. This initiative was consistent with the view prevalent among US policymakers 
of the FSF as a vehicle to ‘upgrade’ regulatory policies in emerging market countries and 
to foster convergence around international regulatory ‘best practices’ (Bluestein 2012, 
13).  
However, the FSF failed to develop adequate mechanisms to promote the 
implementation of its international standards. The responsibility to review the 
implementation at the national level of the 12 Key Standards was undertaken not by the 
same FSF but rather delegated to the IMF and World Bank as part of the newly 
established Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC). Moreover, this process remained 
voluntary and individual countries maintained the right to veto the publication of the 
results of this monitoring exercise in full or in part. Over this period many of the emerging 
countries that were the primary target of the initiative have engaged in what Walter has 
called ‘mock compliance’ or suppressed the publication of the results of this oversight 
(Walter 2008). Most importantly, the same US policymakers which had over this period 
urged emerging countries to subject themselves to this international review refused until 
2008 to undergo the same review of its own regulatory system (Foot and Walter 2010). 
As Germain argues, over this period the FSF was ‘able to move no farther or faster than 
its most powerful member states’ in promoting compliance with internationally-
coordinated measures (Germain 2011, 52).  
Besides the limitations in the capacity of the FSF to promote compliance with the 
existing international best practices, the FSF has also played over this period a limited 
role in directing the international public policy agenda. In particular, other international 
standard-setting bodies that comprise the FSF have remained reluctant to see their 
autonomy curtailed by the newly created institution (Donnelly 2012). Most importantly, 
the FSF has developed only a limited capacity in developing regulatory policies on its 
own. At its first meeting the FSF set up three working groups in charge of presenting 
recommendations pertaining the regulation of three areas of concerns, that is, 
international capital flows, highly leveraged institutions such as hedge funds, and the 
regulation of off-shore financial centers.  However, since then the FSF has refrained 
from publishing additional issue specific reports on its own, limiting its role to that of 
reporting on the work of other international standard-setter bodies. This passive role has 
been attributed to the preferences of the US and other authorities for keeping the body 
as primarily a forum to promote communication and coordination among its members 
rather than an action-oriented institution (Davies and Green 2008).  
Also the track record of the FSF over this period in fostering awareness among its 
officials of the emergence of vulnerabilities has been put into question. The semi-annual 
meetings of FSF have addressed different of the issues that have been recognized as 
among the major causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010, such as the growth 
of off-balance-sheet vehicles, the growing signs of strain in the US housing market, and 
the need for rules regarding the cross-border resolution of financial institutions. However, 
these discussions proved to be largely inconsequential, not leading the authorities 
comprising the FSF to depart from the dominant paradigm of the period. As one central 
bank governor participating to the FSF declared, while ‘members’ discussions about 
vulnerabilities have identified a number of different areas of concern over the years’ but 
‘it was not always clear how useful those discussions had proved to be’ (Bluestein 2012, 
16).   
 
Despite these shortcomings in the conduct of the FSF in the years preceding the crisis, 
the revelation of significant market failures in the summer of 2007 and the origin of these 
shortcomings across a variety of sectors have contributed to bringing the FSF back at 
the center of the international regulatory stage. The FSF met as early as September 
2007 to discuss the implications of the market turbulence for regulatory policies and 
measures could be introduced to strengthen the stability and resilience of the financial 
system stability (FSF 2007).  
During this meeting the FSF established a small senior group of central bankers, 
regulators and chiefs of international standard-setting bodies called Working Group on 
Market and Institutional Resilience, which has played a key role in dictating the initial 
response to the crisis. The Working Group has identified in its Report in April 2008 a 
wide range of market failures at the roots of the crisis, from the fraudulent practices in 
the US subprime markets to the weaknesses in the role of rating agencies, suggesting 
67 different policy recommendations. Moreover, the FSF has over this period effectively 
directed the work of other international standard-setting bodies, national regulators, and 
private market actors, often setting specific deadlines for the implementation of these 
measures (FSF 2008). The work conducted by the FSF in the early stages of the crisis 
has also been highly influential in shaping the agenda of the G20, which had replaced 
the G7 as the main political forum in response to the crisis. The recommendations 
presented by the G20 Leaders during the first meeting in November 2008 largely 
followed the road map delineated by the FSF (Helleiner and Pagliari 2009).  
  
The valuable role played by the FSF in delineating an internationally coordinated 
response to the crisis led the G20 leaders to revamp this body. At the G20 Summit in 
London in April 2009 G20 leaders agreed that ‘the Financial Stability Forum should be 
expanded, given a broadened mandate to promote financial stability, and re-established 
with a stronger institutional basis and enhanced capacity as the Financial Stability Board’ 
(G20 2009, 1). Unlike the FSF, the newly created institution was also given a Charter 
detailing an expanded set of tasks and a more complex internal governance structure.  
G20 leaders have also agreed at the Cannes Summit in November 2011 to ‘strengthen 
FSB's capacity, resources and governance’ in order to allow the institution to keep pace 
with the broader range of functions. In particular, the G20 leaders agreed to establish the 
FSB ‘on an enduring organisational footing’, with a ‘legal personality and greater 
financial autonomy, while preserving the existing and well-functioning strong links with 
the BIS’ (G20 2011). The proposals identified by the FSB to achieve this goal were 
included in an amended Charter adopted by in 2012 (FSB 2012f).  
This represents a partly paradoxical outcome. As argued above, the FSF had in the 
years before the crisis achieved only a limited impact over the governance of 
international financial markets. Despite this track-record, the origin of global financial 
crisis in the same industrialized countries that dominated the FSF has increased the 
urgency of negotiating an internationally coordinated response to the crisis and led the 
G20 countries to revitalize the role of this institution. The next section will discuss more 
in depth the functions performed by the FSB to achieve this objective. 
 
 
3. What Role for the Financial Stability Board? 
 
The previous section has discussed how the FSF had played during its first decade only 
a very limited role, primarily as a result of the constraints posed by the US and other 
industrialized economies dominating the institution. The shift from the FSF to the FSB 
has been characterized by a significant expansion in the mandate of the FSB. While the 
in the case of the FSF the contours of its mission had been defined only in vague terms, 
the FSB Charter has defined in great details the ways in which the institution is expected 
to fulfill its mandate of promoting financial stability. It is possible to summarize four roles 
played by the FSB in the governance of international financial markets in support of its 
mandate: 1) coordinating existing national and international regulatory authorities; 2) 
generating international regulatory policies; 3) promoting and monitoring the 
implementation of financial regulatory policies among its members and non-members; 4) 
identifying emerging vulnerabilities and issues of concerns. 
 
First, the FSB has inherited from the FSF the role of coordinating the activities of the 
different international standard-setting bodies and national authorities. This had been 
identified by the Tietmeyer Report as one of key rationales for the creation of the FSF in 
1999. The importance of the FSB in coordinating the activities of different international 
standard-setting institutions and steering them towards areas that they had not covered 
in the past has clearly been in display during the financial crisis. For instance, the 
involvement of the FSB has been important in pushing securities regulators coordinating 
through IOSCO towards addressing more extensively the financial stability implications 
of their policies. The FSB was also instrumental in highlighting the financial stability 
implications of the use of ‘fair value’ accounting in the existing accounting standards, an 
element neglected by the IASB (Lombardi 2011). The participation to the activities of the 
FSB of the heads of these international standard-setting bodies have facilitate the 
transmission of the priorities identified by the FSF into the activities of these institutions 
(Lombardi 2011). 
The FSB Charter has also given this institution a formal role in overseeing the activities 
of the other standard-setting bodies. Article 2 lists among the duties of the FSB to 
‘undertake joint strategic reviews of and coordinate the policy development work of the 
international standard setting bodies to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, focused 
on priorities and addressing gaps’. During the crisis the FSB has started to publish visual 
summaries of the progress made by the different standard-setting bodies in meeting the 
objectives and deadlines set by the G20 (FSB 2012e). At the same time, while the 
Charter grants the FSB a special position in overseeing the work of other standard-
setting bodies, it makes explicit that that this review ‘should not undermine the 
independence of the standard setting process’ (Article 6.3). In sum a clear hierarchical 
relation between the FSB and other standard-setting bodies has not fully emerged from 
the crisis, which according to Donnelly remains focused more on ‘communication, 
consensus-building, coordination’ then about ‘handing out instructions’ (Donnelly 2012).     
 
Second, the involvement of the FSB in the development of international financial 
standards has gone beyond coordinating the work of other international standard-setting 
bodies. On the contrary, the creation of the FSB has led to expansion of its role in 
directly initiating international regulatory initiatives. In particular, throughout the course of 
the crisis the FSB has drafted a series of measures pertaining issues not falling directly 
within the jurisdiction of any single international standard-setting institution. For instance, 
the FSB has drafted principles and recommendations concerning the oversight and 
regulation of the shadow banking system, compensation practices, data collection on 
international financial network connections, consumer finance protection in the area of 
consumer credit, and many others. Moreover, the FSB has taken a leadership role in 
tackling the problem of banks that ‘too big to fail’, identifying those financial institution 
that qualify as systemically important financial institutions and coordinating the 
development of international measures to strengthen the regulatory oversight of these 
institutions. These standards and recommendations have often been developed together 
with other international economic institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank, OECD, and 
the BIS, as well as with private market-participants that have been involved in the 
standard-setting work of the FSB through consultations and private-sector task forces. 
While at the beginning of the crisis the FSF/B has primarily operated as a convening 
forum coordinating the work of other international standard-setting bodies, during the 
crisis the number of standards and recommendations developed directly by the FSB has 
come to exceed that of other standard-setting bodies. The growing importance of the 
FSB as a standard-setter has also been formalized in the FSB Charter. In particular, the 
Article 2.3 introduced in the FSB Charter in 2012 highlights this role by affirming that the 
FSB should ‘develop or coordinate development of standards and principles …. in areas 
which do not fall within the functional domain of another international standard setting 
body, or on issues that have cross-sectoral implications’ (Article 2.3).  
Third, the FSB has expanded its influence also over the domestic implementation of 
these international standards. As argued above, this was one of the main weaknesses of 
the FSF in the years before the crisis. The creation of the FSB has led to a formalization 
of the commitment of the FSB members towards implementing the international financial 
standards and disclosing their level of adherence (FSB 2010). The FSB Charter lists 
implementing financial standards and undergoing an assessment under the IMF-World 
Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) among the conditions for 
membership. By January 2010 all FSB member jurisdictions had participated or were in 
the process of participating in a FSAP, including those that had refused to undergo such 
review before the crisis (FSB 2010). FSB members have also committed to disclose their 
degree of adherence of international financial standards by publishing the assessments 
prepared by the IMF and World Bank as a basis for the Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSCs).  
 
The creation of the FSB has also led to the introduction of a new mechanism to monitor 
the adherence of its members to international standards: peer reviews. Unlike the top-
down review by the IMF and World Bank, peer reviews are based on a continuous back 
and forth between the country being reviewed and a restricted group of experts from the 
countries and international institutions that comprise the FSB in an attempt to generate 
social pressures and mutual learning (Lombardi 2011). During the first few years of its 
existence, the FSB has conducted a number of ‘thematic’ peer reviews to assess the 
implementation of different internationally agreed standards across its membership, 
starting from the implementation of the ‘FSB Principles for Sound Compensation 
Practices’. The FSB has also introduced a mechanism for individual countries to address 
specific compensation-related complaints by firms that document a competitive 
disadvantage as a result of the inconsistent implementation of the Principles and 
Standards by firms headquartered in other jurisdictions (FSB 2012d).  Besides these 
thematic peer reviews, the FSB has also conducted a number of country peer reviews, 
monitoring the compliance of specific members with a wide range of international 
commitment. Mexico was the first country peer reviewed by the FSB in September 2010, 
followed by Italy, Spain, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland during the following year.  
The FSB has also regulatory updated the G20 regarding the state of the implementation 
of its commitments among its members. In particular, the FSB has identified in October 
2011 those areas perceived as most critical for global financial stability, and made these 
subject to more intensive monitoring and reporting of implementation progress on a 
country-by-country basis, reporting on implementation progress in each of these areas at 
least once a year (FSB 2011a).   
 
It is important to notice how the involvement of the FSB towards monitoring and 
promoting compliance with its international standards has also extended to countries 
that are not FSB members. At the time of the creation of this FSB at the London Summit, 
the G20 Leaders called for the creation of ‘a toolbox of measures to promote adherence 
to prudential standards and cooperation with non-cooperative jurisdictions’ (G20 2009, 
5).  In response to this request the FSB announced a ‘balance of positive and negative 
measures’ directed towards non-member countries (FSB 2010, 4). Among the positive 
incentives, the FSB announced its intention to engage in dialogue with those 
jurisdictions where there is weak evidence of adherence to the standards and to develop 
capacity-building mechanisms. In the case these incentives had failed, the FSB 
envisioned as part of its tool kit the option of publishing the names of ‘non-cooperative 
jurisdictions’ which had failed to cooperate with the evaluation process and had 
demonstrated weak compliance with the main standards. However, the initial review of 
61 jurisdictions however has singled out only two jurisdictions (Venezuela and the former 
regime in Libya) as in danger of sanctions as a result primarily to their refusal to engage 
with the FSB (FSB 2011b). 
  
Fourth, the FSB has also been granted an explicit role in monitoring vulnerabilities in the 
financial system, as well as to advise on the implications that these market 
developments may have for regulatory policies. Following a request from the G20, the 
FSB has developed together with the IMF ‘Early Warning Exercises’ to proactively 
identify potential systemic financial vulnerabilities and incipient risks. A division of labour 
has emerged between these two institutions, with the FSB leading the work on 
vulnerabilities and regulatory challenges in the financial sector and the IFM leading on 
the analysis of macroeconomic and macro-financial vulnerabilities (IMF 2010).   
More generally, the FSB has been instrumental to drawing attention to the risks posed 
by recent trends and innovations, such as in the case of its note on financial stability 
issues emerging from exchange-traded funds, and therefore contributed to expand the 
international agenda (FSB 2011c). According to the Charter of the FSB, this review of 
vulnerability affecting the global financial system should occur ‘within a macroprudential 
perspective’ (Article 2.1), in contrast to the focus on the health of individual institutions 
that has characterized the work of other standard-setting institutions that comprise its 
membership.   
 
The discussion of these four roles played by the FSB signals a significant expansion in 
the role envisioned for this institution in the global economic governance architecture 
compared to its predecessor body, the FSF. Moreover, the architects of the FSB have 
tried to strengthen the capacity of this institution to effectively address new challenges 
that may emerge from the evolution of the financial system. In this regard, the FSB 
Charter as envisioned that the institution would be allowed to ‘undertake any other tasks 
agreed by its Members in the course of its activities and within the framework of this 
Charter’. However, as the rest of the chapter will discuss more in details, the capacity of 
the FSB to react to new external challenges remain constrained by its internal 
governance structure and the preferences of its most powerful members.  
 
  
4. The Governance of the Financial Stability Board  
 
How well equipped is the FSB to carry forward the expanded mandate described in the 
previous section? Despite the significant expansion in the mandate assigned to the FSB 
by the G20 leaders, the institution continues to fall short of other international economic 
institutions regarding the policy levers at its disposal to perform the tasks assigned. 
The FSB has been given a very limited staff of around 20 units. While this represents 
more than twice the number of people that staffed the FSF in the years before the crisis 
(Bluestein 2012), the number pales in comparison to organisations such as the IMF and 
World Bank whose work is supported by a staff of respectively 2400 and 9000 
employees (Lombardi 2011). Moreover, the size of the staff is not the element that sets 
the FSB apart from other international economic institutions. Unlike the WTO, the FSB is 
not the product of an international treaty. While its Charter lays out a precise set of 
commitments that the members should follow, this document does not create any legal 
obligation for its members, as stated explicitly in the FSB Charter (Article 16). As a result, 
the agreements reached within the FSB do not have the force of international law, and 
power to impose sanctions for non-compliant countries resides in its member states 
rather than in the same FSB (Donnelly 2012).   
The intention of the architects of the FSB to preserve the member-driven nature that 
characterized the FSF is clear from the FSB Charter. This has identified the ‘sole 
decision-making body’ in the FSB Plenary, that is, the body bringing together all the 
national representatives that comprise the membership of the FSB, as well as the 
representatives of the different international standard-setting bodies, IMF, the World 
Bank, the BIS, and the OECD (Article 9). The Plenary remains in charge of approving 
the work programme and the budget of the institution, as well as of adopting standards, 
reports, principles, and recommendations developed by the FSB. However, unlike the 
Executive Board of the IMF, members of the FSB Plenary have no voting shares, and 
the Plenary operates on the basis of the consensus rule (Moschella 2012). The 
consensus rule has been presented by different commentators as one of the factors 
potentially hindering the capacity of the FSB to perform its mandate, especially since the 
size of the body now comprises more than 70 members (Griffith-Jones, Helleiner et al. 
2010).   
While at its core the FSB remains closer to a loose network of regulators, central 
bankers, finance ministries than to a hierarchical international organisation, the 
establishment of the FSB has led to a number of institutional innovations in support of its 
expanded mandate. Four are particularly relevant: the Chair; the Secretariat; the 
Steering Committee; and the Standing Committees and Working Groups. 
 
First, a central role in steering the organisation is played by the Chair. This figure not 
only presides the Plenary, the Steering Committee, and the Secretariat, but it is also the 
external face of the entire organisation. The Chair is appointed by the Plenary among its 
members for a term of three years that can be renewed only once on the basis of his 
‘recognized expertise and standing in the international financial policy arena’ (Article 21). 
Mario Draghi, former head of the Italian Central Bank, has been the inaugural chair of 
the FSB, followed in 2011 by the former head of the Bank of Canada Mark Carney. 
However, despite the relevance of the position, the chairperson of the FSB maintains a 
‘dual’ role, serving the FSB only on a part-time basis, not being an employee of the FSB, 
and not earning any remuneration (Lombardi 2011).     
 
Second, in contrast to the FSF, the FSB has been granted a larger permanent 
Secretariat to support the activities of the FSB and to manage its financial, material and 
human resources. The Secretariat is directed by a Secretary-General and hosted at the 
Banks for International Settlements in Basel. The staff of the FSB is primarily on 
temporary secondment for quite short periods from the staff of national central banks 
that comprise the membership of the FSB or from the Bank of International Settlements 
and it continues to be paid by these organisations or the BIS, rather than being 
employees of the FSB itself (Griffith-Jones, Helleiner et al. 2010). 
 
Third, while the Plenary is the ultimate decision making body, the primary responsibility 
for managing the agenda between Plenary meeting is carried by a newly established 
Steering Committee. This Committee has been created to ‘monitor and guide the 
progress of the FSB’s ongoing work’, as well as to ‘take forward, after consultation and 
consistent with the directions of the Plenary, any other work necessary for the FSB to 
fulfill its mandate’ (Article 12). 
 
Fourth, the Plenary has been given autonomy to set up a variety of technical committees 
in support of its mandate. The FSB has initially created three Standing Committees. The 
first is the Standing Committee on Assessment of Vulnerabilities, tasked to monitor 
vulnerabilities in the financial system and to issue Early Warnings. The Standing 
Committee for Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation has been given the 
responsibility of addressing coordination issues that could emerge among the different 
members of the FSB as well as to direct standard-setters towards addressing whether 
new standards are required. Finally, the Standing Committee for Standards 
Implementation has given the responsibility to plan peer reviews and report on the 
progress in implementing the international standards endorsed by the FSB. Besides 
these Standing Committee, the FSB has also established a number of ‘Working Groups’ 
to address support the Standing Committees in performing its mandate, such as the 
Analytical Group on Vulnerabilities, the Working Group on Experience with Peer 
Reviews, and the Cross-Border Crisis Management Group, or to address specific issues 
on the agenda of the FSB, such as the Task Force on Shadow Banking, the OTC 
Derivatives Working Group, or the Consumer Financial Protection Consultative Group. 
 
Finally, the FSB has established in 2012 a new Standing Committee on Budget and 
Resources (Article 17) in charge of assessing the resources required for the Secretariat 
to perform its mission, review the budget, and identify mechanisms to improve the 
transparency in the matters of financial governance of the FSB. The establishment of 
this committee reflects the attempt to meet the goal set by the G20 leaders in 2011 to 
strengthen the FSB’s capacity, resources and to establish the institution ‘on an enduring 
organisation footing’ (FSB 2012f). One of the tasks assigned to this Standing Committee 
is to ‘identify, evaluate and recommend to the Plenary options for independent raising of 
resources by the FSB, over the medium term, to supplement the funding received from 
the BIS’ (Article 17.3). 
 
These changes certainly fall short of the transformation of the FSB into a treaty-based 
international organisation with the status of subject of inter national law and capable to 
exercise influence independently of its members. There continues to be little support 
among the FSB members for this kind of solution, as well as for creating more 
compulsory mechanisms to enforce compliance on the model of WTO’s dispute 
settlement panels (Lombardi 2011).  On the contrary, the FSB members have remained 
committed to the old model by stating that the organisation should remain a ‘member-
driven’ organisation and its ‘decision making on policy issues should continue to be 
based on consensus’. (FSB 2012f). From this perspective, while the transformation of 
the FSF into the FSB has been characterized by the development of new policy levers to 
perform its mandate, it is debatable whether this shift has led to a transfer of power from 
the key stakeholders to the organization. 
 
 
5. The Membership of the FSB 
 
The changes in the mandate and in the internal governance of the institution analysed in 
the previous sections are not the only transformations that have followed the 
establishment of the FSB. Another key difference between the FSB and its predecessor 
body can be found in their respective membership. 
At the time of the creation of the in 1999, the FSF was characterized by a geographically 
narrow membership that was confined to representatives from the same G7 countries 
that had created the institution. The Tietmeyer Report had suggested that a ‘small 
number’ of countries may be added to the original membership over time (Tietmeyer 
1999). In the following years, the FSF has expanded its membership to include Australia, 
Hong Kong, the Netherland, Singapore, and Switzerland.  
According to the primary architect of the FSF Hans Tietmeyer, the limited size of the 
Forum was necessary in order to ‘permit an effective exchange of views and the 
achievement of action-oriented results within a reasonable time-frame’ (Tietmeyer 1999, 
5). Similarly, the first Chairman of the FSF Andrew Crockett argued the institution may 
be more effective if its membership was ‘homogenous’ (Liberi 2003, 573). However, also 
preference of the G7 countries for ensuring their control over the international financial 
agenda has been presented a key reason for the narrow membership (Drezner 2007). 
As a result, in the first decade of the FSF the involvement of the main emerging markets 
and developing country representatives in the activities of the institution has been limited 
to ad-hoc working groups. 
 
The outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007 has set in motion important pressures 
to broaden the range of countries involved in the reforms of the global finance. The 
decision by the Bush Administration in November 2008 to call for a G20 Summit for the 
first time at the Leaders level in order to coordinate a political response to the crisis has 
provided the main emerging market governments with a platform to voice their 
discontent regarding the limited membership of the FSF and other financial regulatory 
institutions (Bluestein 2012). Their demands for an expansion in the membership of the 
FSF and other standard-setting bodies were welcomed in the Communiqué released by 
the G20 leaders, which stated: ‘The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) must expand 
urgently to a broader membership of emerging economies’ (G20 2008). When the 
Charter of the newly created Financial Stability Board was announced in April 2009 this 
included in its membership not only representatives of the countries already part of the 
FSF but also representatives of institutions from all the other G20 members.   
 
Similarly to the FSF, the different countries are not equally represented within the 
Plenary. On the contrary, each country is allocated a number of seats on the basis of its 
size, the size of its financial markets, and its national financial stability arrangements 
(Article 11). The G7 countries maintains three representatives in the plenary, including a 
member from the central bank, a representative from the treasury or finance ministry, 
and a financial regulatory authorities. The so-called BRIC countries were successful in 
achieving a similar status. Australia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, South Korea and 
Switzerland were granted only two representatives, while Argentina, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, and Turkey have instead only one 
representative. The expansion in the membership has involved not only the FSB but also 
different of the standard-setting bodies that comprise its membership (Basel Committee, 
the Technical Committee of the IOSCO, the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems and the International Accounting Standards Board) which have over the same 
period revised their membership to enhance the representation of developing countries.  
The attempt to rebalance the geographical representativeness of the institution is not 
limited to the membership of the Plenary but also to the staff that according to Charter of 
the FSB should ensure ‘a balance composition in terms of geographic regions’ (Article 
22.5). Moreover, while the FSF used to report to the G7 finance ministers and central 
bankers, the FSB is now formally accountable to the G20, regularly reporting to, and 
receiving instructions from, this forum. 
 
While these steps have certainly significantly strengthened the representativeness of the 
FSB compared to its predecessor, the FSB still lacks the legitimacy that derives from the 
kind of quasi-universal membership of institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. The 
fact that a vast majority of developing and emerging countries continue to be excluded 
from the FSB membership is at odd with the renewed focus on promoting compliance 
with its financial regulatory standards also among non-members. Different proposals 
have been presented to align more closely the FSB to the quasi universal membership 
that characterize these institutions, for instance by creating a IMF-style constituency 
system or making the FSB accountable to a body with universal membership rather than 
the G20 (Helleiner 2010).  
In contrast to these proposals, the FSB has adopted a different approach, strengthening 
the practice already adopted by the FSF of inviting officials from non-member countries 
into ad hoc meetings (Bluestein 2012). The FSB Charter has institutionalized this 
‘outreach’ by granting the FSB Chair the authority to extend ‘ad-hoc invitations’ to 
representatives of non-FSB Members to attend the Plenary Meetings, as to participate to 
the activities of the working groups established by the FSB Standing Committees (Article 
10.3).  
 
Moreover, in the revision to the Charter introduced in 2012 the FSB has endorsed the 
creation of ‘Regional Consultative Groups’ comprising both representatives from FSB 
members and non-member countries from different regions (Article 20). The six groups 
initially created bring together officials from the Americas, Asia, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
65 non-member countries have been included in these regional groups. Each group is 
co-chaired by a non-member and an FSB member, both from the region, who are 
chosen respectively by the non-members and by the FSB members in the group. 
Regional Consultative Groups were designed with the intention of providing a 
mechanism for FSB members to discuss with non-FSB members the different initiatives 
underway and to promote implementation of FSB policies, but also for non-FSB 
members to share their views on vulnerabilities affecting the financial system and 
possible policy responses. The FSB member chair of the Regional Consultative Groups 
presents the views of the group to the Plenary and members of the regional groups are 
invited to propose issues to be discussed by the Plenary.  
Moreover, the discussion occurring within the Regional Consultative Groups should feed 
into the agenda of the FSB via the FSB Review Group, a group comprising FSB 
members and the co-chairs of the Regional Consulting Groups. This group has identified 
a set of financial stability issues and recent regulatory reforms, whose potentially 
adverse impact on emerging markets and developing economies has been analysed 
more in depth by the FSB in coordination with the IMF and World Bank (FSB 2012a).  
 
While the agenda of the FSB during the crisis has reflected primarily the concerns of 
those industrialized countries that had dominated also the agenda of the FSF, the 
creation of regional groups has created a platform for these countries to express their 
priorities on international financial regulatory reforms. The agenda of the first meeting 
held by each of the six groups between the end of 2011 and the beginning of 2012 has 
reflected in different cases concerns that are typical of these regions. For instance, the 
both the Asian and the Sub-Saharan African Regional Consultative Group have 
discussed risk of spillover for the region from the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the 
policy options for reducing the volatility of capital inflows and the development of 
domestic capital markets (FSB 2011d; FSB 2012b).  The Regional Consultative Group 
on the Middle East and North Africa has discussed the challenges faced by host-country 
authorities in the regulation of international financial institutions and the development of 
domestic capital markets (FSB 2012c) .     
 
In a nutshell, while non-member countries continue to be excluded from the formulation 
of international standards to which they are expected to comply (Lombardi 2011), these 
initiatives have opened new channels for developing and emerging countries to 
formulate and voice their priorities. The extent to which these different channels that 
have been opened for developing and emerging countries will translate into real change 
in the agenda of the FSB will play a key role in influencing the legitimacy of the FSB and 





The analysis of the FSB presented in this chapter has detailed a growth in the role and 
effectiveness of the institution from being primarily a weak coordination mechanism 
among national and international regulatory authorities to an institution capable to 
exercise a greater independent impact over the global economic governance. The wide 
set of tasks detailed in the FSB Charter, the numerous institutional arrangements that 
have been introduced in support of these tasks, and the greater legitimacy that derives 
from the expanded membership all represent important improvements in the capacity of 
this body to effectively promote financial stability and close emerging regulatory gaps.  
On the other hand, this analysis has highlighted numerous elements of continuity with 
the FSF that may weaken the effectiveness of the FSB in the future. First, similarly to the 
FSF, the FSB still remain a member-driven organization. This means that capacity of the 
FSB to achieve regulatory change remains constrained by the preferences of its more 
powerful members and their capacity to reach a consensus. Despite the success in 
steering the international regulatory agenda during the crisis, the institution continues to 
lack significant enforcement capability of its own and its capacity to promote compliance 
among its members and non-member institutions remain largely untested. Second, while 
the expansion in the membership of the FSB and the incorporation of the main emerging 
countries has addressed one of the most important legitimacy issues undermining the 
FSF in the years before the crisis, it is not clear yet how the FSB will be able to reconcile 
the expanded membership with the consensus-based decision making process that 
govern the institution. Third, despite the expansion in the membership, the FSB still 
remains a ‘club’ which excludes from its membership the large majority of developing 
and emerging market countries. The capacity of the FSB to reconcile the limited 
membership with the objective of promoting stability in global financial markets, and to 
promote regulatory change in the countries that are excluded from its membership 
remain another important question mark. As a result, the capacity of the FSB to 
effectively function as a “fourth pillar” in the global economic governance architecture 
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